Dorian Benkoil senior consultant at Teeming Media. An award-winning journalist and editor, he was a foreign correspondent for AP and Newsweek, and international and managing editor for ABCNews.com. At ABC News he moved to the business side, handling sales integration and business development, before joining Fairchild Publications as General Manager for their Internet division, becoming editorial director for mediabistro.com, then a consultant for Teeming Media in New York. He graduates this year with an MBA from Baruch's Zicklin school of business. Learn more about him at Benkoil.com or his blog - MediaFlect.com.
Robert Cauthorn is a journalist, former vice president of digital
media at the San Francisco Chronicle, and was the third recipient of
the Newspaper Association of America's prestigious Digital Pioneer
Award. He launched one of the first five newspapers web sites in the
world and is generally considered to have delivered the first
profitable newspaper web site in 1995. Cauthorn has been in the middle
of the transition from old media to new and is recognized as
frank-talking critic when he believes newspapers stray for their
mission. In mid-2004 he became the president of CityTools, LLC a new
media startup based in San Francisco.
Ben Compaine has divided his career between the academic world and private business. He was a journalist when manual typewriters were considered state of the art, but also led the conversion of his college newspaper to cold type. He has started and managed weekly newspapers. His dissertation at Temple University in 1977 was about the changing technologies that were going to unsettle the landscape of the staid and low profit newspaper industry. Since then he has focused his research and consulting on examining the forces and trends at work in the information industries. Among his most well-known works (and the name of his blog) is "Who Owns the Media?".
Vin Crosbie has been called "the Practical Futurist" by Folio, the trade journal of the American magazine industry. Editor & Publisher magazine, the trade journal of the American newspaper industry, devoted the Overview chapter of executive research report Digital Delivery of News: A How-to Guide for Publishers to his work. His speech to the National Association of Broadcasters annual conference was one of 24 orations selected by a team of speech professors for publication in the reference book Representative American Speeches 2004-2005. He has keynoted the Seybold Publishing Strategies conference in 2000; co-chaired and co-moderated last year's annual Beyond the Printed Word the digital publishing conference in Vienna; and regularly speaks at most major online news media conferences. He is currently in residence as adjunct professor of visual and interactive communications and senior consultant on executive education in new media at Syracuse University's S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications, and meanwhile is managing partner of the media consulting firm of Digital Deliverance LLC in Greenwich, Connecticut.
About this blog
Two forces have shattered the news media. Technology is the first. Although media technology is undergoing its greatest change since the day in 1440 when Johannes Gutenberg first inked type, for more than ten years now the news industry has mistaken new technologies merely as electronic ways to distribute otherwise printed or analog products. Estrangement is the second. The news media has lost touch with people's needs and interests during the past 30 years, as demonstrated by rapidly declining readerships of newspapers and audiences of broadcast news. How we rebuild news media appropriate to the 21st Century from the growing rubble of this industry is the subject of this group weblog.
Two pieces of seemingly unrelated news hit the online world about 24 hours apart. However, the first may weigh heavily on the second.
Number one was the announcement yesterday (June 2) from AT&T signaling the end, for now at least, of unlimited wireless broadband. As of June 7 most 3G iPad users and all buyers of iPhones and other AT&T connected smartphones will have to pay for data based on usage. Unless grandfathered, from now on it will all be metered.
According to most reports (the New York Times’ David Pogue among them), most smartphone users should come out ahead by under either of the two plans. AT&T itself calculated that 65% of its subscribers use less than 200 mb of the lower price option (half the cost of the current unlimited plan they have) and altogether 98% use under the 2 gb limit of the higher price plan. But for the newer iPad, optimized for streaming video and more accommodating for watching You Tube, will these parameters stunt their use?
The matters if we probe the implications of the second news item, an AP story under the headline “Publishers see signs the iPad can restore ad money.” It began: “Good news for the news business: Companies are paying newspapers and magazines up to five times as much to place ads in their iPad applications as what similar advertising costs on regular websites.”
The story noted that “early evidence suggests the iPad is at least offering publishers a way to get more money out of advertisers.” Perhaps prophetically, though, author Andrew Vanacore hedged his bets, adding two graphs later: “Still, a lot will need to go right for publishers before the iPad and imitator tablet computers become a significant source of income.”
The seeds of what may not go right comes soon enough. Describing why iPad applications such as USA Today’s can justify higher ad rates than the standard online ad, Vanacore replays this scenario: “A reader can click on Courtyard by Marriott's USA Today ad and then with a flick of a finger scroll through images of the hotels' updated lobby design. Another tap and a high-definition video appears, full of happy hotel guests.”
But wait. With AT&T’s new data limited plans, this simple “tap” will generate perhaps megabytes of “high definition” video. Will tablet users want to eat up precious data usage on a Marriott ad. When the pool was bottomless, well, so what. With the pool is emptying fast, then perhaps not. At least, not as spontaneously.
AT&T’s new data plans are likely to be mimicked by other carriers eventually. Some or all might hold off initially so as to gain a short term competitive advantage. But they know AT&T is right. The spectrum for data is finite and when any commodity is free it get overused. Some mechanism is needed to ration it.
Every decision has consequences. It’s not unusual for some to be unintended. Matt Richtel, in his report describing AT&T’s data plan announcement, closed his piece with this anecdote:
“Mike Lapchick, an AT&T customer in Chicago, said that he tended to use his iPhone mostly for e-mail, and that he would probably see his data bill drop in half to $15.
“But Mr. Lapchick, who is the chief executive of a company that makes software used by Internet retailers to allow consumers to zoom in on product images, has another concern. As unlimited data plans go away, it could prompt cellphone users to watch their intake.”
He may not have realized it, but Lapchick could have been describing every media business that has hope that iPad and its competitors' forthcoming tablets may just have been blindsided by AT&T without being aware of what hit them. At least not yet.
According to a piece from The New York Times this week, “No topic is more hotly debated in book circles at the moment than the timing, pricing and ultimate impact of e-books on the financial health of publishers and retailers.” It goes on to says that publishers are concerned about making e-editions of their trade books available the same time as the print edition.
Amidst the uncertainty of how to treat the e-books is the fear of cannibalization of hardcover sales. “If you as a consumer can look at a book and say: ‘I have two products; one is $27.95, and the other is $9.95. Which should I buy?’,” according to Dominique Raccah, chief executive of Sourcebooks.
I’ve been delving into the nuances of book distribution and marketing since I wrote a book about the subject in 1978. And, typical for anything about the book publishing industry, notably missing form this article, and most such discussions, is an examination of the economics and the retail marketplace.
First, for bestsellers, at least—which is what this article focuses on—the real retail price of a hardcover fiction is not about $25 or $30 but the 40% discount price charged by most major outlets, including Amazon and B&N. Thus, the real price difference for most consumers is roughly $15 to $18 for the hard copy vs. $10 for the e-book.
Second, the article does have one data point—that Amazon is paying the same price for the e-book as the hardcover. Assume that is 50% off list. So that from the publisher’s position, it gets the same revenue no matter which format. And it saves the manufacturing cost. And it gets no returns! What’s not to like?
Third, this discussion would be enhanced by knowing how author royalties are being handled these days. If the author is earning a royalty based on a percentage of the revenue the publisher receives, then it is at worst a wash whether it is a percentage of the physical book or the price the e-book distributors pay. And to the extent that books are price elastic, the $10 e-book price point could potentially increase sales, thus resulting in greater revenue.
The difference between the business model needs of the legacy media and the new Web based media has t do with network externalities. This economic concept holds that the value of the services increases exponentially with the number of users of the service. Think telephone networks, fax, Facebook. In all these cases the value is in other users. For the traditional media there are few if any network affects. The value of the content of the Boston Globe to be is neither increased nor decreased for me as circulation does down—or up. Twitter, on the other hand, becomes more valuable as more users can get access to posts or me to the potential posts or more and more other users.
I’ll come back to this at the end.
The construct of network externalities struck me while reading coverage of the annual media conference sponsored by small investment bank Allen & Co. for 27 years usually generates news just because of who attends: the top executives of the big media companies, the young stars of the Internet challengers, investment bankers, some politicians, academics and a few outliers, like a sports star. Though the sessions are closed to the media, there are enough leaks to keep the scribes busy,
Most years the gist of the news is about who might be acquiring or merging with whom. This year, in the midst of an economic slump that puts the kabash on merger activity, much of the chatter was about business models. Media companies that for decades—or centuries—thought they knew where their revenue was coming from are in a quandary about where they might be getting their next dollars or Euros.
Thus the latest theme is the insistence-- from New Corp’s Rupert Murdoch, IAC’s Barry Diller, Liberty Media’s John Malone, Disney’s Robert Iger, among others -- that the free content gravy trend must end. Consumers are going to have to learn to pay for content online as they do in print or via cable, for music and movies. The legacy media have been struggling with the online model for years now—so far with limited success to show for their all their studies, experiments and worries.
But for me, the more fascinating discussion was the one of the business model for the new guys, like Twitter and YouTube. Diller reportedly told one session that he did not see how Twitter could make any money, despite its growing visibility. It has something north of 4.5 million accounts, but only a small fraction actually post anything.
What business model might work for Twitter? It has been highly successful in attracting users and in generating “buzz.” But so far it does not have a business model. It is operating on $55 million of venture capital.
A report on the Allen & Co conference, says that apparently some of the smartest media and Web executives could not come up with a model that would work to generate revenue without undercutting the network externalities that have been so crucial to Twitter's adoption.
Barry Diller, a media industry veteran, commented "I think it's a great service. I just don't think it's a natural advertising medium." John Malone, a cable industry pioneer and savvy media investor, voiced a similar view. Twitter would be hard-pressed to sell advertising on its messaging service without alienating users. He added that Twitter's best bet is to simply get people so addicted to the service that they might eventually pay fees. Malone claimed that Warren Buffet, one of the most successful investors, was thinking along the same lines, applying that model to YouTube, another media property that is wildly successful as measured by use, but still quite unprofitable. Buffett told Malone he would pay $5 a month to continue using it (that’s easy to say for the second wealthiest man in the world).
So here we have publishers and programmers and cable operators not only worried about their tried, if not quite true, business models in the face of declining circulation or viewership, unable even to see a healthy financial outcome for the new players that are growing exponentially, at the same time they achieve millions of users. Can it be that bleak?
So, finally, back to network externalities. The reason why a subscriber fee as a revenue source is a dangerous road for Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, or YouTube and the like is that any sort of charge, even a nominal one, is likely to lop off a substantial portion of its user base. This is the "Penny Gap.” – the experience that getting a user to go from free to any sort of payment, even a penny, is, in the online world, harder than getting a paying subscriber to pay more.That is, going from free to one cent a month would see a larger drop off in users that a service charging $1 riaisng its price to $2. The Penny Gap effect sets the network externality model in reverse. As some users drop off, the service becomes less useful to the remaining users, they are less enamored with it and drop and so it spirals down. Thus, services that thrive on network externalities need to proceed very cautiously—as their founders and managers presumably understand.
The folks who run the Web sites of legacy media, whether the online sites of the newspapers or newer sites like Hulu, do not have this issue. The value to me of my local newpaper—or its Web site—does not depend on the increase or decrease in the numbner of subscribers (except indirectly in the form of maybe more or less content as it generate more or less revenue).
The Penny Gap issue remains. Though media execs are calling for an end to free content as a way to save their franchises, so far no one has been willing to make the move, as they fear it will have a greater impact on the ad revenue than user fees will bring in. When The New York Times abandoned its subscriber Times Select pay tier, it made the decision that it could make more from advertising to large numbers than from a combination of subscriber revenue and lower advertising dollars.
The lesson is that the legacy media folks are going to have to solve their business model problem with a different solution than the one that might be best for new content Web sites like Twitter.
What could the Globe fetch? Well, certainly nothing within a rifle shot of the $1.1 billion it paid 16 years ago. David Carr, himself of the Times, asked six experts who specialize in valuing media properties. You could get the short answer in his column.
But even more fascinating is the almost stream-of-conscious responses of the six that he posts verbatim on the Media Decoder blog at the Times site.
The values—all guesses of course-- range from $250 million to a negative $25 million. Yes—The Times Co. might need to offer a buyer (if it could be called that) cash to take off their books the stream of losses projected for the paper into the immediate future, the union contracts and the 400 guaranteed-for-life jobs.
Bottom line? The price of the newspaper company may be less than what it charges ($1.00) to buy a copy of the newspaper.
Few of my friends or acquaintances are fans of the editorial
page of The Wall Street Journal. I live in Cambridge,
Mass, where President Obama received 88% of the vote in November.
So I thought I’d call their—and your—attention to the lead editorial
in today’s paper. Titled “Ink-Stained Politicians,” it is critical of congressional
initiatives to “rescue” the newspaper industry. One of the leaders of this
movement is my own senator, John Kerry. As are many of us, he is concerned
about the future
of the hometown Boston Globe. (The stakes may be particularly high, though,
for the senator. In his re-election bid last year the Globe gushed:"The case for reelecting John Kerry
would be strong under any circumstances . . . [but] the country needs his voice
more than ever.")
So it was Sen. Kerry’s subcommittee that held
a hearing on May 6 titled "The Future of Journalism." It was a
morose affair, with publishers enumerating the fate of failing and fallen
comrades. Then the senators turned to the culprits, Huffington Post and Google.
The hook for the
hearings was what role Congress could conjure to help out what Kerry buys into as “the fourth branch of government.” One
proposal, from Maryland Senator Benjamin Cardin, would allow newspapers to convert
to nonprofit status (hmm-it seems like the point is that they are already nonprofits.
What they should say is not-for-profits). Their operating revenues would be tax
exempt. In return, they would be precluded from endorsing political candidates, though, as the
Journal points out, that wouldn’t prevent them from taking sides more subtlety.
The other idea being floated was some sort of an antitrust
exemption that, as described by Dallas Morning News publisher James Moroney,
would allow the newspaper industry to conspire to find ways for making money from
putting the work of its journalists online. Of course, I thought that was what
the industry has been doing with such projects as Newspaper Next and The Newspaper Project. But I
suppose a major league baseball-like exemption would allow publishers to band
together for steps that would prevent the Huffington Posts and Googles from
making money off their backs.
The Journal’s position is one that I have trumpeted, as have
my colleagues here Dorian
Benkoiland Vin
Crosbie. That is to let the forces of technologies, consumer behavior and
the marketplace play themselves out, at least for awhile longer, before
panicking. I
have argued (as have others) that there will be changes, for sure. But that
there will also evolve multiple business models. There will be winners and
losers. Services lost-- for example some local coverage if some cities or towns
lose their daily printed papers—are highly likely to be regained as new players
jump in to fill a vacuum.
We see hints of that with an array of Web sites that focus
on local and even hyperlocal news. Some, like EveryBlock, for the moment are compendia
of links to local government sites, some blogs and even local news from other
sources. But that doesn't mean that is their end point. It is their opening gambit. Should they gain traction some will start adding original content (or they may find the togain traction they will need original reporting). A few, such as Buffalo Rising and Patch, already do have reporters covering the local
scene. Very few now. But given time, and a market, more
later.
Dallas’s Moroney
speaks for many in the legacy media who are urging Congress to legislate a
"consent for content" requirement to get the Googles and Huffington
Posts of the online world to pay "fair compensation" for content they
pick up and then sell advertising on. The
Journal comments“So, although most
newspapers are giving away their content free online, the feds should guarantee
them a stipend from anyone who gets someone to pay for it. There's a winning
business model.”
In any event, it would seem to be a matter for negotiation rather than legislation.
The Journal continues: “The larger story here is that
newspapers are enduring the familiar process of economic "creative
destruction," in this case brought on by the Internet. Advertisers are
fleeing to search engines, while barriers to entry in publishing have crashed.
Despite the pain this causes to certain companies, this is not much different
than any other industry buffeted by new technology or business strategies.”
Creative destruction is right. In the early 1990s, the 200 year old Encyclopaedia Britannica was a $650 million company. Five years later in was bringing in one third that. It’s business model based on a high priced part time sales force selling “guilt” as much as $2000 sets of books was undermined by Microsoft’s Encarta, given away for free on a CD with a new computer and based on an old Funk & Wagnall supermarket-distributed encyclopedia. The World Book suffered similarly. Both have had to retreat and reformulate to survive in the world of DVDs and online delivery. Where was Congress then?
The Journal’s editorial concludes with an argument almost
stolen (dare I charge?) from a recent post of mine, save the last line:
“Some new business model will
emerge for journalism, if not for all newspapers, and in the meantime the
business of reporting the news isn't vanishing. It is taking new forms and
adapting, with newspapers growing their audiences online even as the sources of
their revenue shift. The industry is currently debating how to charge customers
for content, and no doubt many experiments will be tried. No matter who emerges
victorious, the journalism business will be stronger and more credible if it
avoids the government's embrace.”
To its credit, the Obama Administration is keeping its distance. Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, responding to a question, commented that while it's sad for cities to lose their daily papers, any public assistance "might be a tricky area to get into.…I don't know what, in all honesty, government can do about it."
The sooner the suits in Washington
and the executive suites in Dallas
understand that, the better off it will be for the future of journalism.
A college classmate, Peter, who lives in Ann Arbor, Michigan, asked me what “my take” was on the changes in the media world, referring to the de facto demise of this home town Ann Arbor News.
If you’ve been on vacation in Bali and didn’t want to pay the $15 a day resort Internet fee, the shut down of the 45,000 circulation News will make this the first city to lose its newspaper. The plan, according to owner Advance Publications, is to completely shut down the operation, lay off all empoylees, then start fresh with two new companies that will need far fewer staff. One, a Web venture called AnnArbor.com, will have some original reporting but rely substantially on reader input and community forums. A second company is described as a printing company that will publish a twice weekly newspaper fo some sort. Advance is also cutting back its daily newspapers in Flint, Saginaw, and Bay City to a thrice weekly schedule.
Types of organizations eligible for non-profit status under IRS 501(c)
My take, I wrote Peter, is that I suspect new players will see it as an opportunity to pick up the slack. They will enter with a different expense base. Maybe no single one will totally replace today's version of the newspaper, but in aggregate they will cover whatever territory for which there is a demand, e.g., an entertainment paper-- probably ad supported. More local stuff online. More stuff you can view on iPhone-like devices or Kindle-like. We’re in a period of fits and starts, but if there is a market there will be big guys or entrepreneurs who will fill the gaps. At the premium end there is the example of the for-profit (they hope) GlobalPost.com. The low end may be the for-profit (they hope) citizen journalist new AnnArbor.com.
But what about the not-for-profit model, a proposal popularized by an op-ed piece in The New York Times last month? An academic study being prepared for publication in the Journal of Media Economics this summer (I’ll post more details in July) looks at the fortunes of nonprofits in the magazine business. It notes that “nonprofit” can take many forms, both legally and as operational models. Many not for profits rely heavily on advertising revenue, just as their for-profit cousins. The study observes that they can be just as susceptible to economic downturns as for profit publications.
Indeed, at a small conference I attended earlier this month, I pointedly asked Rick Edmonds of the Poynter Institute whether the general downward pressures facing the newspaper industry had affected the St. Petersburg Times. That paper is something of the poster child for the non-profit model. The paper is controlled by a foundation set up by the late Nelson Poynter. If the paper has a surplus – the nonprofit term for profit—it declares a dividend. This is turn is the primary source of support for the many good program of the Poynter Institute. Edmunds had to admit that the Times is indeed taking a hit from the same forces felt by all newspapers. It has made staff cuts in its newsroom to help keep up profit. Even so, dividends are down. The Poynter Institute has a comfortable cash reserve for now. But the larger point is that the Times as well as the Institute are not immune to the forces and trends in the industry or the economy.
Philanthropic organizations—even the wealthiest—cannot defy gravity. Harvard, the richest of universities, is having to make major cutback because its endowment—line the financial markets—shrunk 22% ($8 billion) between July and October 2008 alone.
So let’s suppose that a newspaper does indeed have a billion dollar endowment behind it. To generate income it must invest that money somewhere. The more aggressively it’s invested, the more money for the newsroom. If invested in Treasury notes, the endowment is safer—but it may be short changing its mission—essentially leaving money on the table that could be used for journalism. So it takes a moderate course of investment. And suppose that lets the endowment generate a 5% return devoted to newspaper operations. That would be $50 million initially, a nice subsidy to keep up salaries, news bureaus, staffing. But what happens, as it has this past year, if the invested funds lose 20% of their value—well under the markets overall financial loses in the past year, thanks to our hypothetical endowment's conservative portfolio.
Now, with an $800 million portfolio, if it still drew 5%, it could only add $40 million to its income. What’s a publisher to do? Just as advertising and circulation revenue are falling, so is the endowment income that could otherwise prop up its finances. True, it may be better off than its fully for- profit brethren. But it will inevitably need to make cuts: in personnel, in travel, in salaries—the same types of cuts we hear about weekly.
So not-for-profit is not the solution, endowments are not the solution. What is?
As I wrote to Peter, there is not a solution. We have left behind an either/or world for one of many options. There is opportunity for non-profits, such as the well established Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting or the new Pro Publica. The entrepreneurial for-profit sector is represented by a new model with GlobalPost. The Detroit newspapers are leading the way (or were pushed) for daily newspapers in hybrid online and print. Advance Publications is trying out another for profit model in Ann Arbor.
The result will be an evolving stew of print, online, mobile, video and audio news sources—international, national, local and hyperlocal. For profit and not for profit. From existing well known media companies, from nonmedia players, from entrepreneurial start-ups. Those that will be successful and those that will prove unsuccessful.
When I teach about marketing, the most important word I emphasize is the word “some.” I tell them not to think in terms of “People want more news” or “People are willing (or unwilling) to pay for…” Market segmentation is about “some." “Some people” want. “Some people” will pay. Some. The digital technologies here and still emerging make it far more efficient to provide news, entertainment, whatever, to each of us in more forms than at any time in history.
I fell asleep the other night watching Twitter CEO Ev Williams on Charlie Rose (not his fault, I was tired), so am relying on PaidContent’s synopsis of what he said. He was apparently vague on how Twitter plans to make money. Co-founder Biz Stone was less so in a conversation he and I had for the We Media Game Changer awards.
Biz indicated they’re hoping to forego traditional advertising and instead quiz their power corporate users to find out what kinds of services or features they might pay for -- a way, for example, to officially verify that a Twitter account is actually from who it claims to be. From the Game Changer essay (PDF Format):
They plan to start creating revenues this year, moving up from their original plan of 2010, asking businesses like Whole Foods, Jet Blue and Comcast -- who use Twitter feeds to stay in touch with customers -- what new features and services they might pay for. He doesn’t, he says, expect you’ll see traditional Web advertising.
Biz said they don’t know what the services would be but is confident the companies they ask will have ideas that Twitter can then turn into something that will be paid for and help create a sustainable business. He said he wants it to be an easy-to-use tool (not one-off consulting). Another idea he hinted at was helping companies monitor mentions of their names, and turn that into a commercial service.
With Twitter’s open API, though, and thousands of mashups and applications, with more every week, I can’t help but wonder if ideas like what Biz is proposing will already be developed by someone else before Twitter gets to it. What’s to prevent a third party from making a powerful way for companies to scrape and find mentions of their name? Others have already tried to integrate ads. (Twittads is one example.) StockTwits is building a business off the Twitter platform. Dell has sold $1 million of equipment, it says, off its feed. So, if there is a way for Twitter to help Dell double, or quintuple that, sure, there could be a business. But will Twitter, itself, get there first? One of the very things that has made them so powerfully successful, their openness and ability of others to use and re-use the tool, may also be a challenge. On the other hand, pundits at first said Google had to way to make money.
There is a delicious irony that the wireless phone companies reap the rewards of enlisting tens of millions of users to pay about $10 monthly for the feature of sending and receiving 160 character text messages, yet publishers can’t make a business of convincing a small fraction of that number to pay half that amount to receive an online “newspaper” or magazine.” We pay to create our own information but won’t pay to receive news and other information created by “professionals.”
This phenomenon is at the heart of a sudden groundswell of concern for the future of the newspaper. Of course, it’s been building, with wave after wave of bad news (which editors thrive on when it refers to anything but their own backyard) of steep declines in circulation and an erosion in advertising that transcends the fall off signaled by the general recession.
And the remedies being proposed? Stripped to their core, there are two. One is to rely on some form of philanthropy. An investment officer at Yale and a financial analyst propose turning newspapers into nonprofit organizations, perhaps endowed by a foundation. They estimate that it would take only $5 billion to fund The New York Times (assuming I suppose a stock market that is more robust that we see at the moment).
The second is to cajole readers to pay something for the online version or to pay more for the print version. In this column I’m focusing on the latter. Another day I’ll add my analysis to the non-profit fantasy.
The re-ignition of the “pay for content”—or as it is now called a “paywall” --- is a response to the tsunami of bad news emanating from all corners of the legacy media business. Although local television and radio are hurting while magazines are downsizing, most of the Sturm und Drang has been about the even worse performance of newspapers. The New York Times has eliminated its dividends to conserve cash and has taken a $250 million loan from a Mexican oligarch. Hearst Corp., once the largest newspaper publisher in the U.S., put the Seattle Post-Intelligencer up for sale Jan. 9, and announced it will convert to digital only or shut it down if a buyer is not found soon. Same for its San Francisco Chronicle. The Detroit Free Press and The Detroit News now deliver papers only on Thursdays, Fridays and Sunday. The Tribune Company is in bankruptcy. And on it goes.
The argument of the growing bandwagon is that newspapers must stop giving away their content free in their online incarnation. They can’t depend on advertising revenue to pay for the same amount of quality journalism that has been supported under the traditional newspaper business model. They need to start charging something. Though not new (I last wrote about it almost three years ago), the subject has been largely dormant until recent months) when a flurry of articles and Blog posts have energized the subject. Tim Burden, at Printed Matters, has nicely annotated the debate since December.
The Achilles heal of this line of reasoning is that advertisers have long covered the full cost of content for newspapers. The share of the total cost of running a newspaper that is derived from circulation revenue has at best covered the cost of the paper, ink and maybe the press, the gas and trucks. Subtract the cost of the presses, printing and delivery and subtract the revenue paid by readers and what is left is the actually the cost of producing the content and the revenue provided by advertisers. At its core, readers have been receiving the information for free for decades.
So if the issue is how can “newspapers” continue to provide whatever mission we think they have fulfilled for the past century as they migrate to an all digital format, then we must follow the money. And that takes us to advertisers-- the same folks who make Google “free” and Yahoo “free” and Huffington Post “free” and “Politico “free.”
If newspapers have essentially been able to thrive on the revenue from advertisers alone (again, with cost of printing more or less covered by circulation revenue), why are they having so much trouble today? The answer is not one single factor, But a major contributor is that newspapers – whether print or digital—are just worth less to advertisers than they were 20 years ago. Back then, local advertisers did not have many options for reaching the mass local audience. What was the alternative for auto dealers? For real estate agents? Supermarkets or department stores? For some, direct mail was one possible option. But that was about it. Using pre-prints instead of ROP became attractive for some large display advertisers, leaving the publishers with a piece of the cash flow. Advertisers were hit with regular rate increases. And they pretty much had to pay, The publishers made good money.
But then a double whammy. Just about the time the Internet became a real alternative for classified listings—think Craigslist, Monster.com, eBay, Autotrader.com—and for retailers—think DoubleClick, Google, et al—the boys at the cable operators had perfected the insertion of highly local spots into their feeds. Between 1989 and 2007 local cable advertising increased from $500 million to $4.3 billion—or from 0.4% of all advertising to 1.6%. Advertising in newspapers fell from 26% to 15% in this period. Although some of the highly local advertisers going to cable may have taken some of their funds from budgets for radio or other local media, it is probable that a significant share came from the hides of newspapers. I estimate perhaps up to 20% of the decline in local newspaper advertising share can be attributed to local cable spots.
The other whammy, the gorilla in the room, is Internet advertising. No need to elaborate. But its impact on newspapers is not just that it has siphoned off dollars per se. Much more importantly is that the Internet has given most advertisers greater market power against newspaper publishers. Many big advertisers—like car dealers, real estate offices and big box retailers—don’t need the newspapers as much.
And this also explains why even an all-digital newspaper may have trouble supporting its economic model with online advertising. If newspapers could have simply eliminated all hard copy production costs and kept its advertising rates at the online equivalent of print milline rate, they could be profitable even with less advertising. But online rates are much lower on an equivalent copy sold vs. online visitor basis.
All old media also had a house edge over advertisers stemming from merchant John Wanamaker’s insight, “Half my advertising dollars are wasted. I just don’t know which half.” Now they do. Publishers (and broadcasters) are at a disadvantage in promoting the efficacy of their product when online metrics provide much greater certainty on who is clicking and even buying, vs. the legacy media.
Hence, the renewed look at shaking coins from the readers or viewers. Easier wished than accomplished. We already have a history of those who have tried and succeeded. It’s a short list: The Wall Street Journal. Those who have tried and considered it a failure include The New York Times, Slate, the Atlanta newspapers and USAToday. The Penny Gap lives.
The magnitude of the challenge can be distilled from The New York Times’experience with its Times Select. In its two years of existence, the Times attracted 227,000 paying customers, at $49 annually. This translates into about $11 million annually. And this was just for access to a portion of its material. In abandoning a partial pay model, the Times calculated that it could get greater revenue from advertising on those paid for pages by opening them up, no charge.
I suspect that what we will find in the intermediate future is a mix of models and choices, among them:
• The Detroit model is one reasonable experiment: An attractive daily digital version, with home delivery of the paper reduced to Thursday, Friday and Sunday.
• An advertising supported all digital model, with the publisher closing down the printing plant, selling off its trucks, laying off the circulation and production departments.
• A voluntary pay model. This may take one of several forms. The “shareware” model for software has proven to work to a point. Users are asked to pay what they can or think the product is worth. Many users will be free riders. But, as we see with public television and radio, millions in their audience make annual contributions. (In 2007 at least one-third of those who downloaded Radiohead’s free "In Rainbow" album made a payment, in some cases higher than what the band would have received from a CD sale.)
How these and other variations develop will also depend on changes in the mobile business. The rate of adoption of SmartPhones with iPhone-sized screens; the pricing and availability of e-readers, such as the Amazon Kindle and the price for wireless broadband will enter into the viability of digital news formats replacing physical formats.
Investors here at the AlwaysOn media conference have been confirming in private discussions and on stage what angel investor David Rose said recently: that their money is having to stretch farther, that others are reluctant to come into the rounds as early.
One venture capital investor also told me he’s seeing “A Series pricing” for B and C rounds, meaning that people investing even later in a company’s life cycle are able to, for their money, get a larger share of the equity. For example, instead of getting 15 percent of the company, they’re able to get a fifth of it, he said.
But in a sign of optimism, another, based in Silicon Valley, said that funds of money that were raised 1-2 years ago are still uninvested, so they will need soon to find something to invest in in the next few months.
Later, on a panel about later-stage venture capital investment, Alan Spoon, Managing General Partner of Polaris Venture Partners, said he was seeing more funds looking to others for liquidity, trying to shore up balance sheets and less interested in such calculations as ROI (return on investment -- which in the financial world is a more specific ratio than often gets thrown around in advertising) and IRR, another ratio that figures out the internal rate of return -- how much a company is supposed to be able to earn from the money it has.
The pressures on the markets are making hedge funds and mutual funds get out of the venture game, the panelists also said, and money is being lent and companies being valued at much lower valuations than before the bust.
The auto industry is not the only one in Detroit that is hurting badly. The Wall Street Journal reported today that The Detroit Free Press and The Detroit News will cease home delivery four days a week. The two newspapers are independently owned (by Gannett and MediaNews Group, respectively) but operate under a joint operating agreement that handles business operations for both papers, including delivery.
It’s no surprise that newspapers have been hurting, but the Detroit papers seem to be failing faster than those in other cities. Circulation of the papers is down between 15% (Free Press) and 22% (News), a long term slide that has no doubt been exacerbated by the troubles particular to Detroit’s major business.
The official announcement, expected next week, specifically refers to home delivery, suggesting that the papers will continue to print hard copies daily, with distribution limited to newsstands the four non-delivery days. The digital versions will continue as well.
I would have to assume that, if this comes to pass, the green eye shade folks have figured out the savings for this half-a-loaf strategy. I need to be convinced. If they do indeed still turn the presses every day, then the only savings are the variable costs of ink, newsprint, and delivery costs for the home delivered copies. All other fixed first copy costs stay the same. Subtracted from the savings is the lower advertising rates that could be charged for those days, reflecting lower circulation. The cut back is expected to be accompanied by a dramatic redesign of the print editions, which may have some cost implications. I guess we should wait for the details to make a final judgment.
The pending announcement makes very real the current virtual office pool in media circles, the winner being closest to predicting when the first major city newspaper would announce it would become an online-only service. Indeed, we may have a winner. in his column last week on media predictions for 2009, Business Week columnist Jon Fine included this precocious prophecy: “More than one newspaper in a top-100 market ceases publication or reduces its print edition to something unrecognizable as a daily newspaper.” Had he heard the scuttlebutt about Detroit, or is he just that good? (Fine also wrote “At least one recent, heavily leveraged media deal—Tribune, Univision, Clear Channel, the Minneapolis Star Tribune, I could go on—goes bankrupt. A week later the Tribune company did file for Chapter 11, though that debacle was a bit more foreseeable).
Two months ago, the Christian Science Monitor announced that it would become a weekly in print, along with its continually refreshed Web version. The Monitor has long been suffering so it was even less a surprise that the Tribune filing.
Still, this is quite likely the start of a trend. Some publishers may be emboldened by the Detroit plan to move ahead their own online-only strategy. Others can wait and see how it works out for Gannett and MediaNews, then either follow suit or decide to find other ways to cut costs. My own prediction (drum roll please) if that over the next two or three years more dailies will move to a hybrid platform, akin to Detroit, with less than daily delivery or even printing. The early trickle could become a stampede by the end of the decade, regardless of how fast the economy recovers. Newspaper economics are changing.
Ignorance isn't bliss to the dying. Witness the pathos of American daily newspaper companies. Most have finally begun to realize that the deterioration of their businesses isn't cyclical but grave. Yet few, if any, understand why. Almost all grasp for the reasons.
Some attribute their grave condition to advertisers suddenly switching huge portions of spending from print to online - an excuse that ignores more than 30 years of declines in those newspapers' printed editions' circulations and readerships. Some others attribute their deterioration to not having transplanted their content into online quickly enough -an excuse that ignores not only the dozen years they've spent transplanting it but how their online editions are now read even less frequently and less thoroughly than their printed editions.
Most of the print newspaper experts who diagnose these companies' condition still prescribe stale nostrums such as more consumer focus groups, subscription price incentives, more stylish typography, or shorter stories. Meanwhile, most of the experts who diagnose these companies' Web sites prescribe balms and accessories such as giving blogs to reporters, adding video, or having the readers themselves report the stories. American daily newspaper companies have long been too financially impatient to submit themselves to anything but ostensibly quick cures and they've even longer been too conceptually myopic to perceive the real reasons for their declines.
I'll declare the real reasons. There are but two and neither has anything to do with multimedia, 'convergence', blogs, 'Web 2.0', 'citizen journalism,' or any ancillary topics you may have heard presented at New Media conferences this millennium.
Nor is either of the real reasons advertisers' abandonment of printed newspapers. Their abandonment is a symptom, not the reason for the decline. Contrary to myopia of many newspaper executives, advertisers aren't newspapers' primary customers. Although advertising revenues may be sunshine for newspaper executives, the roots of their business are readers. A newspaper with readers will attract advertisers but a newspaper without readers will not. Readers ultimately support and sustain the newspaper business.
To understand the real reasons why the American daily newspaper industry is dying, first understand why more and more Americans are no longer reading daily papers and how their abandonment of newspapers has been wrought by changes in their own media economics. Also comprehend why the epicenter of the newspaper industry's problems in post-Industrial countries is America and exactly how grave the situation is there.
Today was the first public edition of “The Sporting News Today.” This is a free, online daily version of The Sporting News, the weekly magazine that got its start as a bible for baseball fans.
The Sporting News has a rich history, starting publication in 1886. I remember my father subscribing in the 1960s. It was thick with box scores and stats for every team and every major sport. In 1977, when the Times Mirror Co bought the publisher for all of $18 million it had a circulation of about 356,000. By the time it was sold to Vulcan Ventures in 2000 for $100 million it had a circulation of over 500,000, but it was being threatened by the successful launch of ESPN Magazine, which had 850,00 circulation within two years of its 1998 launch.
The Sporting News was sold again in 2006, to American City Business Journals. Today the circulation is about 700,000, but at an annual price of only $14.97 for a new subscription—compared to about $61.00 in constant dollars in 1978.
Like many print publications, The Sporting News has been substantially affected by online content. Daily sports news has been particularly hard hit. The Internet is made for getting late night scores, accessing the scads of stats that even casual fans crave, following teams in far-off cities—and all for little or, most often, no consumer cost.
Like most other print publications, it has had an online presence. The Sporting News Today is something else though. It is a magazine formatted for the screen. But it is not like a Web site. It involves no scrolling. It is pdf-like, though it is not read with Adobe Reader. It is not the print edition read online, as with Zinio. To me each screen looked like a double page spread in a magazine—but with no need for a gutter. I sort of felt that I had spread opened the tabloid-sized magazine. You will note that each of the “double pages” has one page number.
By offering to send subscribers an email each day, readers so do not have to bookmark anything. Just click the link.
The content is vintage Sporting News: Right now heavy on baseball, but lots on football—professional and college. There is hockey, basketball, NASCAR, tennis. Even Little League World Series coverage is promised. And, with a nod to WEB 2.0, it will offer readers the opportunity to provide their own input: “You’ll get a byline, file to an editor.” (Actually, a clever spin on “Letters to the Editor.”)
No surprise, the business model for the Sporting News Today is, for the moment at least, advertising, though it was rather light for a first edition. The inaugural issue had a full page from SpeedTV.com, three half page house ads for Sporting News affiliates and a full page promotion for the revamped Sporting News magazine, which will become a bi-weekly. (Management expects to lose 100,000 circulation from current levels to the free online publication).
I’m not a design expert—I’ll leave that to my colleagues at Innovation Media Consulting Group. But the Sporting News Today will feel comfortable to readers who like the look of print and are put off by clicking here and there for do their online reading. The layout feels modern but grounded in print. How that plays may be generational—or not.
As a final note, it may be worth pointing out that while traditional print publications are downsizing, The Sporting News Today is hiring. Indeed, I got turned on to its impending launch by Charles Apple, it’s new art director, who was hired away from the Virginia Pilot newspaper. (Has anyone seen numbers on how many print journalists have been hired by online-only ventures other than self-funded blogs?)
There has been speculation in recent years on when we will get the first announcement that a daily newspaper will shut down its presses completely and switch to digital-only. There are still some big hurdles, like portability. But should services such as Amazon’s Kindle take off, allowing readers to take their digital publications on the go, then the Sporting News Today model may have legs and encourage a general interest newspaper to give it a whirl.
There’s a lot of grumbling and retorting about the AP’s attempt to then sort-of retreat from making bloggers either paraphrase or take down their pickups of material from the venerated wire service. But there’s a more immediate problem that runs deeper than complaints from bloggers like Michael Arrington, Jeff Jarvis or Jeff Nolan.
A few weeks back the editor of the Cleveland Plain Dealer on "On the Media" talked about how newspapers in Ohio were reaping great benefits trading material, and linking and cross linking. More importantly, she said she was no longer reliant on The Associated Press for her stories from the region but instead was getting the original versions direct from the other sources around the state rather than paying “a big chunk” of her budget, about $1 million for rewritten AP stories. Picking up directly, on the Web, and putting other papers’ stories directly in the newspaper was also better quality, she said, and readers were noticing:
“I mean, we've always had access to news from all over the state. It was just, you know, it went through the AP mill. I frankly think we're getting better, more distinctively written stories because they're not going through the AP mill.”
If local papers skip the AP, that means the core constituency is in revolt. That will potentially be more corrosive than the fight with the blogosphere over fair use. "As long as there are are two papers to trade articles, the AP will exist," one rake at the wire service -- where I worked for seven years on the international desk and as a foreign correspondent -- quipped to me once. But what if the members form their own cooperatives and cut out the AP as middleman?
I’m not saying this will happen immediately. AP, whose core business is the not-for-profit cooperative dues of member newspapers, has offered to cut its rates starting next year. Newspapers, despite ad and circulation declines for decades, have been notoriously slow moving, and many will be reluctant to pick up content from papers they might think of as competitors; the AP has given them the cover they sought to do so less blatantly. But the economic pressures are only increasing as revenues and readership decline more precipitously, and any success in Ohio could be the thin edge of a wedge. “We've set up this little cooperative,” said the Plain Dealer editor, Susan Goldberg. “I don't know how it'll work in the future, but right now it's working really well.”
Add to that AP’s deal to have its direct results placed higher in Google than member papers, further pissing them off, and newspapers will look harder at the Ohio example. We're talking months or perhaps years, certainly not decades. The example could spread nationally or internationally.
CEO Tom Curley has been leading the AP into a future in which an increasing share of its revenues comes from sources other than member dues, such as direct photo revenues, Web content services and broadcast fees. But the transformation may not be fast enough. AP doesn't have the luxury of Bloomberg or Thomson Reuters in which news gathering can be supported by financial terminals that really bring in the bucks.
AP should own the Web. It has its roots in the trading and sharing of information. It gets a significant chunk of revenue from providing the backbone through which others pass content. It coded and tagged and parsed content with everything from category codes to prioritization markings, and ways to match text and photos decades before those practices became fashionable for everyone. But culture and old habits are very hard to change, and I fear for the company's viability hope it can work out a more creative win-win solution for all.
Sometimes less can be more. This is the implication of my colleague Dorian Benkoil’s thoughts here last week about how newspapers (and other legacy media) might position their Web-based content to optimize revenue over eyeballs. Special interest magazine publishers have long worked this way, charging far higher cost per thousand ad rates for Time Inc's Fortune for example, than for its People, as the former has more attractive demographics for many advertisers than the latter. So a far smaller circulation can bring in as much revenue and perhaps greater profit margins than more circulation and costs. This has been the economics behind many subject-focused cable TV channels as well.
Here’s another way to look at more by subtraction. David Pogue, a New York Times tech columnist who I find entertaining and quite informative, had a column last month about why a product can be a success even with acknowledged flaws. Referring to Apple’s Mac Air he wrote:
…When your laptop has the thickness and feel of a legal pad and starts up with the speed of a PalmPilot, it ceases to be a traditional laptop. It becomes something you whip open and shut for quick lookups, something you check while you're standing in line or at the airline counter, something you can use in places where hauling open a regular laptop (and waiting for it) would just be too much hassle.
It's the same lesson I learned when I reviewed the Flip "camcorder" a couple weeks ago: if you change the shape and concept of something enough, it ceases to be that thing. It becomes a new thing, or a descendant of that earlier thing. But it's no longer the original thing, and you can't judge it on the same yardstick.
Lesson learned: Form—the products attributes—can create the function. Thus an entrepreneur can break out of a well-defined category (camcorder, laptop, cell phone) by changing some key characteristics—weight, time to boot up, capabilities—even a dramatic new price point.
Does this insight provide any guidance for the media industry? Should the local newspaper continue trying to be a general interest publication even when online? Is it already something else, in which case it needs to be evaluated by a different metric (i.e., time spent, return visits) than what has been used in the past (i.e., hits or clicks or gross eyeballs or total page views)? Or, perhaps, should legacy media be creating new “things” based on the old? What is the media equivalent of the Mac Air or Flip camcorder: a product that is recognizable but, by changing—often removing—product attributes is used by consumers (and advertisers in this case) in new ways?
Experiments with short form videos—first popularized from the bottom up thanks to the YouTube platform—have now become mainstream with the traditional video programmers. Viacom purchased short film pioneer Atom Films in 2006. But most attention continues to be on finding outlets for conventional programming, such as NBC Universal/News Corp.’s Hulu.
If I had the answer I’d offer it (though probably not here—a guy’s got to feed his family, or in my case, start paying college tuition). But I think it is an area ripe for brainstorming and another round of informed trial and error.
Have you heard about the “Freemium” business model? It’s a label offered by James Governor Jared Lukin in a “name-that-model” contest proposed almost exactly two years ago in a post at A VC by Fred Wilson, a partner in a New York venture capital firm.
Wilson looked at many of the more successful Web ventures and observed that what they had in common was a basic service that they offered for free and a step-up premium service that they charged for.
The basic voice over IP service Skype, for example, lets users call anyone anywhere for no cost, so long as both the caller and callee are at broadband-connected computers. However, if you really want to be able to call anyone anywhere—that is, to a land line or cell phone -- there are per minute charges. Want voice mail? Upgrade to Skype Pro.
A wonderful service I use called LogMeIn employs a similar approach. It gives me access to my desktop computer from any other computer, anywhere. A free version lets me see all my directories and files and transfer them to my remote laptop. The upgraded version actually displays the screen of my desktop, with access to any program or file, as though it was on my remote computer.
There are many other examples.
But for the Freemium model to work, Wilson observed there are other characteristics that demarcated the more successful implementations and the others:
• Ideally, they don’t require any downloads or plug ins to start. Lots of exceptions here, but it is a helpful goal.
• Support every browser with any material market share. There is no excuse these days to be FireFox or Safari challenged
• Make sure the service works on various flavors of Windows, OSX, and Linux.
In short, he says, eliminate all barriers to the initial customer acquisition.
But unlike 30 day free trials before having to pay, a true Freemium experience ensures that whatever the customer gets day one for free they are always going to get for free. Nothing is more irritating to a potential customer than a “bait and switch.”
If Freemium is such a great approach, why wasn’t The New York Times’ foray into this model more successful? It gave away a basic service and, with Times Select, offered a premium upgrade.
Part of the answer (there is sometimes but not usually a silver bullet) may be that the model is most likely to succeed when the customer implicitly understands why the paid service has to cost money. Free e-mail accounts that offer greater storage for a fee. Termination cost on other carriers networks in the Skype model is explicit justification. In the case of TimesSelect, it would be obvious to most readers that arbitrary withholding of access to some portions of content was not related to significant costs. It may have made some sense as a “value” play, yet it clearly did not work. “But if your free service is loved and you do a good job articulating the value that comes with the paid service, you can convert to paying users with good results,” concludes Wilson.
The Freemium model was augmented one year later by another venture capitalist, Josh Kopelman. He has labeled his observation “The Penny Gap.” I recall meeting Kopelman when I was teaching at Temple University in Philadelphia. He had started Infonautics Corporation, the predecessor of today's High Beam Research, in the early Internet days. I assume from that he learned some lessons about offering a subscription service that gave users access to a wide range of magazines, journals, reference and newspaper material. (And that he was more successful with a subsequent venture, Half.com, acquired by eBay).
The Penny Gap says in essence that getting a user to go from free to any sort of payment, even a penny, is harder that getting a paying subscriber to pay more. Going from free to $1.00 is a much higher hurdle than from $1 to $2, even though the difference is the same. The Penny Gap is a disconnect with classical economic theory, which would hold that demand increases as the price decreases. As Kopelman illustrated in the accompany figure, getting users to make any financial commitment is the greater hurdle than the amount itself.
What does this say about the content-heavy online ventures of the legacy media business? In large measure it helps explain why they settled for the most part (well, except for The Wall Street Journal) on an advertiser supported Web model. From USA Today to Slate to The New York Times media sites have tried and failed to make a user pay model stick, despite offering some high grade content.
But by dissecting the successful non-media sites that have achieved a substantial user-pay component, could media firms find areas where they can truly find value added to justify a premium? I’m not optimistic. Two years ago I might have offered that a comprehensive ad-free video service could be sold at a premium. Recall CNN tried that with its Pipeline service, providing real time video streams and an archive of telecasts. It met many Freemium characteristics, including a presumption of additional cost for all the storage and bandwidth. Apparently Time Warner determined that more advertising revenue outweighed the subscription dollars. Hulu, the new NBC Universal-News Corporation joint venture, is all free, all the time. It has not made noises about offering paid-for premium content.
The bottom line is that as a generalization the media business may not get over the Penny Gap chasm. For those firms that have been on the electronic side, where advertiser supported has long been the total revenue stream, maintaining that model may be easiest to accept. For that segment of the print media that has been used to drawing at least some of its revenue from consumers, resigning itself to only advertising may be tougher. And perhaps a bit of a blow to its self-esteem.
We know—or thought we knew—that Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer are smart fellows. But smart, as in understanding software architecture or how to manage a company or develop products is a different kind of smart than strategic smart. Apparently Messrs Gates and Ballmer don’t have the smart big acquisition gene.
I say this as an outsider. I don’t have access to the crunched numbers and five year outlooks no doubt ginned up by the Microsoft investment bankers. And, to be sure, many business pundits have a similar pat justification, all along the lines that both Microsoft and Yahoo have persistently tried to best Google but failed. “No one can compete with Google on their own anymore,” says Jon Miller the former chairman and chief executive of AOL. “There has to be consolidation among the major players.
Suddenly Microsoft, just a few years ago the bad boy of the computer galaxy, is—what—the white knight? Mark Read, director of strategy for the WPP Group, which owns ad agencies like JWT and Ogilvy & Mather, opined, “It is good for investment. It is good for competition.”
A combined Microsoft and Yahoo, notes The New York Times, would beat Google in Web traffic and come closer in ad revenues. Most importantly, the pair would give Google a greater challenge as it tried to enter display advertising, because Yahoo has the largest share of that market.
But wait a second. What does a merger with Yahoo really do for Microsoft—to the tune of a cool $44 billion? Lets look at some numbers.
Google has grown dramatically, going from zero to $17 billion in revenue. It is highly profitable, a bit (well, $200 million) over $4 billion in 2007. Very impressive. But Microsoft had almost 3.5 times that revenue -- $58 billion—and four times the profit-- $17 billion.
So what does Yahoo bring to the party? Not even $7 billion in revenue and a piddling $660 million in profit. It brings a search engine that’s technically pretty good. But Microsoft already has a comparable piece of technology. Yes, most of its revenue is derived form online advertising, nearly twice that of Microsoft.
And what’s the synergy of Microhoo? (or Yahsoft?). Not much that is obvious. Microsoft forecasts at least $1 billion in annual cost savings for the merged entity, from synergies in areas such as combining engineering talent.
Sure, a merger of this magnitude—pegged to cost savings rather than market opportunities-- would make sense if Microsoft was a struggling enterprise. It's not -- and a 29% profit margin at that. It has $21 billion in cash and short term investments. Assuming it actually realized the savings—so what? Microsoft already has the resources to compete with Google—if it is possible at all.
Then what does a Mircohoo end up with? Despite trying, Microsoft has not come up with a strategy to erode Google’s dominance in search and online advertising. Its share of the search market ended last year at 9.8%, down from 12% in mid-2006. Yahoo does better, but fell from an estimated 28.8% mid-2006 to 22.9% last year.
Now, let’s see. We take Microsoft’s failed strategy and add it to Yahoo’s failed strategy... and the best they can come up with is some savings effect, as the combined entity slides further behind.
I understand that the hope is that the two combined would bulk up to a third of the search market—perhaps in aggregate enough to prime the pump to attract more advertisers. But Yahoo alone had nearly a third of the search business in 2005 and that did not keep it from sliding downhill since then.
The combination of Time Warner with AOL in 2001 has been a disaster. However, it was primarily the outlandish $112 billion price tag, negotiated at the peak of the Internet bubble, that made it ridiculous. The notion of an old time content company wanting to modernize by associating with the new media start-up had some strategic sense, even if the conflicting cultures and stratospheric valuation doomed the combination. I could understand the potential synergies, even if not to the degree that could justify the cost.
I can also understand Microsoft’s necessity to segue from the operating system and packaged software business to a greater reliance on Internet-derived revenue. It knows it needs to modify its current business model. But I can think of better uses of $44 billion to get there. Glad I sold my Microsoft stock last year.
NPR’s On the Media in its show before the most recent episode brought up the issue of paying sources and brought back some poignant thoughts about whether and why sources should or shouldn’t be paid. Sure, there are all the usual arguments about polluting the system, encouraging untruths, and starting a slippery slope of checkbook journalism. But, “I've always just questioned that taboo on talking about money,” says guest Robert Boynton, an NYU journalism professor.
I’ve been asked more than once, “Why should I help you?” Some folks I’ve interviewed have even pointed out that I’m being paid to report, that the organization I’m working for (whether a newspaper or TV show) is money-making, even for profit, and so why should we reporters feel sanguine about asking or requiring that the grist for our work be provided for free? It’s a hard question to answer, when you can’t say “for publicity that will help your business,” or if someone isn’t buying the argument that getting the word out may help others in other situations or that simply getting it off their chest will be liberating.
In Japan, it’s common to pay sources, especially when they’re experts -- and, yes, they also get the advantage of publicity. There is, in giving over a token amount of cash, a display of gratitude, and acknowledgement that value has been given. I had one uncomfortable interview in Tokyo while working for Newsweek, when an expert in the construction and maintenance of the Bullet Train gave me some inside information about troubles the line had had in its earlier days. I wondered why he was telling me such info so frankly. At the end, he expected -- as he had come to expect from journalists -- a gratuity, and it was left to a Japanese co-worker to explain to him, with both in considerable discomfort, that American organizations didn’t do that. I was uncomfortable, too.
As OTM co-host Bob Garfield and guest Robert Boynton point out in the radio piece, even when no money is exchanged there is a currency of those who give their time and information in exchange for exposure, perhaps the chance to flog their point of view. Some journalists talk of disinterest in how money is made by the organization they work for, which I find a little odd. Is there another such for-profit industry, where the folks steeped in producing the product are willfully ignorant of how it's sold and makes money? There is certainly a coin of the realm, and one in which journalists spin and get spun, journalists and sources use each other in various ways. Boynton says it would be OK to pay, if it were disclosed that someone had done so. That would be an open and honest way of doing it. Let the consumer make his or her own decisions. And it would be more open than the hidden agendas the public sometimes can’t see.
The Wall Street Journal Online Wants to/Does not want to be free, Part 7
Did I say in November that Rupert Murdoch said that the Wall Street Journal Online would do better with a totally ad supported business model? As Emily Latella would have said, “Never mind.”
We had some discussion here last summer on the scenarios that might justify a free strategy, wherein lower ad rates and foregoing $60 million or whatever in subscription revenue could be made up by 10x greater readership.
Apparently the new owner of Dow Jones is backing off. A report on a Wall Street Journal bureau chiefs’ meeting last week says that “Murdoch has scaled back his ambition to make WSJ.com entirely free.” According to one who was there “He said he originally thought making it free would bring in the biggest audience, but that after studying it it’s not as simple as he thought.”
That newspapers continue to lose advertising market share to the Internet is not a revelation. That newspapers are losing share of local advertising is a reason for concern. According to the latest tally, newspapers accounted for 43.7% of the local online advertising pie of $8.5 billion for the first 10 months of this year. This was down from a 44.1% share of a smaller total in 2004. The online revenue of local TV stations, on the other hand, did not decline so precipitously.
Local advertising traditionally has accounted for about 85% of total revenue for newspapers in larger market, even higher for small market newspapers. Local TV stations receive a far higher proportion of their revenue from spot national advertising, while radio stations have tended to be in between, though in most case closer to newspapers than TV. The primary local competitor for newspapers has historically been directories (e.g., Yellow Pages) and direct mail. Increasingly, cable has been able to siphon off local dollars with the capability to insert advertisements down to the neighborhood level.
What must be most unnerving to newspaper publishers and, to a lesser extent other local media players, is that pure play Web sites now have the largest share of local on-line advertising revenue—43.7% by the reckoning of Borrell Associates.
How can this be? Didn’t the publishers take solace in the fact that their local papers had a built in advantage over the upstarts thanks to their identification with the local market? And that all-critical brand equity?
It is becoming evident that the value of ad placement based on search terms, Zip code or Internet address proves more effective for the local advertiser even if the page viewed does not directly contain information that is congruent with the location of the user. That is, the value of the local newspaper or radio station has been that the advertiser had a high degree of confidence that anyone listening to that station or reading that paper was in their local trading area. But online the advertiser may not only be assured that the ad is placed in view of an individual within their target trading area, but may also have specific demographic or other characteristics desirable for that advertiser. Not to mention the added delight of knowing when an ad may have been seen and responded to in the form of a click or more.
Of course, this is true for the online site of any local medium. Too often, however, it seems that while the publisher’s sales force was working on convincing the paper’s current advertisers to try the online version, the new players had no such blinders. They were marketing to anyone, which often meant new service providers and merchants who had not been print advertisers: smaller in size but far greater in number. A version of the long tail effect. And that is where much of the growth is coming from. It’s not just old advertisers in new bottles.
Is a large circulation newspaper likely to generate more revenue by charging for its online edition or making it free to maximize advertising revenue? Is the online version of a newspaper a complement to the print version—or a substitute? The stakes are high and the answers have been elusive. With few exceptions, since the dawn of the Internet Age, newspapers have been wrestling with whether this new conduit would be its friend or its death.
Of course, we will know in the long run, when some media historian looks back on this time from 20 years hence. But that doesn’t help today’s decision makers. That is why the research of University of Chicago economist Matthew Gentzkow published earlier this year in The American Economic Review is so helpful.
In this highly data driven paper with the typically academic title, “Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarity: Online Newspapers,”, Gentzkow blends consumer data from the Washington, DC market with newspaper operating results to address three questions: What is the relationship between print and online versions on 1) the demand for either diversion, 2) on the welfare of consumers, and, crucially, 3) on the impact of charging consumers for the online product?
With 30 pages of assumptions, explanation and calculations, Gentzkow makes a well substantiated finding that, The Washington Post would have been better off charging a modest sum for its online version (on the order of $6.00/month) until about 2004. After that, however, the growth in online advertising expenditures crossed over to affirm that it is significantly more profitable to set a zero price for the online edition when one factors in even a small transaction cost for online payments. He suggests that his findings are robust enough that they would likely apply to other big city newspapers.
Along the way, Gentzkow upends the early assumption that the print and online versions of a newspaper were complements. Applying a more sophisticated demographic model than had been used in the past, which simply looked at newspaper readers and online readers, Gentzkow concludes that the substitution effect is “nonnegligible." He does add that ”it is “small, however, relative to some earlier predictions.” In other words, real but not likely “to threaten the survival of print media,” at least right now.
Gentzkow further quantifies the “consumer welfare benefit” created by having a zero consumer price for online newspapers, which he put at $45 million annually for The Washington Post’s market. For the 2000-2003 period that came at the expense of Washington Post Co. stockholders, as he calculated it lost money by giving away the online edition when it could have made a profit by charging for it. (Among the factors here is that, as substitute products, by charging for online, some print subscribers would have continued with their subscriptions instead of switching to the online offering). Starting in 2004, however, the Post was more profitable with the free online version that it would have been with an online use charge
Having seen considerable discussion about whether The Wall Street Journal would be better off making its online version free, as the The New York Times has done Gentzkow’s approach is another data point (a rather large one at that) to reinforce the advertising supported model, for mass market newspapers, at least. There are numerous instances, however, where a consumer-paid model will still be needed. In the magazine business, for example, advertising revenue for many of the mass audience magazines, such as People or TV Guide, can be 50% or more of total revenue. But there are many niche publications, such as The Nation or Weekly Standard, that are highly dependent on subscriptions for the bulk their revenue. It is likely to be the same for niche online sites.
News Corporation chairman Rupert Murdoch has made news with several talks this week.
Yesterday he declared that "the sky's-the-limit profits from traditional broadcast TV are over….Free-to-air television faces a lot of challenges, just from the sheer fragmentation of the audience.” Overall he characterized broadcast television as a "highly challenged industry in America."
This may actually be on the minds of some of the striking Writers Guild of America members. The Wall Street Journal reported than some of the writers who work for the soap operas are resigning from the union and going back to work. The audiences for the soapshave been sinking for years. “Writers and producers in the genre fear that by the time the strike finishes, their audiences won't return.”
On Monday Murdoch publicly admitted that he expected the online version of The Wall Street Journal will soon be free. News Corp. will likely close the deal to acquire Dow Jones next month. "We are studying it and we expect to make that free, and instead of having one million [subscribers], having at least 10 million to 15 million in every corner of the earth, keeping up-to-date minute by minute with all business and economic news from around the world," he told an audience in Australia.
Such comments give some insights in News Corporation's strategy and business model. Clearly, advertising will play a larger role in the business model for online content. On the other hand, he is hedging his bets on advertising from broadcasting. First, he advocates making television productions very high quality, so they can be sold to the global market “and then be brought back to America--or to anywhere in the world, for that matter --and be sold as DVDs.”
So, television becomes more consumer financed, while online becomes the prime advertiser-supported medium. At least in Murdoch’s view. How will this be affected, if at all, should DVD’s be supplanted by online delivery, such as by Netflix or Amazon’s Unbox or iTunes video service? Actually, News Corp has a bet there, with Hulu.com, its ad-supported online video venture with NBC Universal.
News Corp. has developed a “portfolio strategy”: When the crystal ball is cloudy, invest in a range of possibilities. Not all need to be a success. Two or three big ones will do.
Reuters reported that News Corp Chairman Rupert Murdoch said on Tuesday he was planning to boost the numbers of subscribers to the Wall Street Journal's Web site more than tenfold by making access free.
"We are studying it and we expect to make that free, and instead of having 1 million (subscribers) having at least 10-15 million in every corner of the earth."
Talk about Google entering the mobile phone sector has been rampant of late. It has driven Google’s already stratospheric stock price up an incredible 20% in the past month.
What Google is apparently working on is not the hardware per se, but an open operating system and applications that play to its strengths in search, mapping, YouTube and, of course, targeted advertising. Various accounts has it speaking with Verizon Wireless, Sprint and T-Mobile in the U.S., possibly others globally.
The first question anyone following this thread would ask is why would any of these players consider opening up their tightly controlled phones? Right now, for example, Verizon customers who want GPS directions pay $10/month or $3.00 daily for data that cost Verizon almost nothing to provide. Other mobile phone data services bring in anywhere from $5 to $45 month. Why would Verizon agree to an open system that would blow open this cash cow?
The answer lies in the same metrics that lead The New York Times to forgo $49 from 220,000 subscribers to its Times Select service. And it is the same calculus that my colleague here Dorian Benkoil (and various commenters) put together for scenarios that might make it more profitable for The Wall Street Journal to give away its online product and forego the $60 million, plus or minus, in subscription revenue. That is, the potential for advertising revenue is greater than the current and projected revenue from the walled cell phone garden.
What are the stakes? In 2006, an estimated $301 million was spent on ads for mobile phone in the U.S. One research firm guesses that should increase to $2.12 billion in 2011. (How can they predict to two decimal places four years from now? Someday I will examine a bunch of these past forecasts and see how they line up with what really happened). But this projection likely assumes that the current cell phone industry model prevails. If a more open network evolved, with advertising dollars available to replace lost subscription revenue, that $2.1 billion would be higher. How much? Ah, there’s the rub.
What I am suggesting here is some credibility to the notion that the carriers, like much of the media industry, might do better from an advertising model than from user revenue for their data services. The most likely carriers to be amenable to a deal with Google would be number three Sprint-Nextel and number four T-Mobile. Word is that the latter may be closest to a deal. But Verizon could want to get in on the act as well to counter AT&T’s excluive with Apple. In any event, Google would likely need to split revenue more generously with the carriers than it does in the media world because the carriers are in a much stronger bargaining position.
If Google does get its foot (or whatever) in the mobile phone world, the impact could be every bit as great as has been its impact in the Web universe. It might force Apple to open up the iPhone even more than it has planned to, as much to accommodate its current partner, AT&T, than out of true belief.
I’m not ready to buy Google stock at $700—but then, I thought it was rich when its IPO priced it at about $85, so don’t take advise on this from me. Still, if they pull this off, $700 may look cheap by 2011.
The most e-mailed story at The New York Times’ site today is the one announcing that the Times is terminating its subscription “TimesSelect” service, effective tomorrow.
Calculated from the Times’ press release , TimesSelect had about 227,000 subscribers beyond its print base. This was generating an estimated $10 million annually. By online subscription standards, both are substantial numbers (though dwarfed by The Wall Street Journal’s base of one million online subscribers).
The Times’ release clearly points to the strategic basis for its decision: It could do better than $10 million in advertising by opening up its columnists and archives to a larger audience. No subtlety here: Denise Warren, chief advertising officer expected that “with the removal of the pay wall… Advertisers on the site can expect to see an unprecedented number of Times readers interacting with their brands." American Express is the first “sponsor” of the newly opened site.
TimesSelect was a bit controversial from the start, and not just with consumers. Many of its columnists, who, after all, get both ego satisfaction and presumably greater impact with a bigger audience, were unhappy being sequestered behind the pay wall.
Although the venerable Times yielding to the advertising-over-consumer payment model seems to add further credence to the “information wants to be free” trend, I have gotten wind of a new venture that aims to succeed as a user payment model for content providers where micropayments has failed. I will supply more details when available.
There have been a number of developments and announcements in recent weeks, which, individually, amount to little more than the now-normal background noise of the media business. But seen collectively, they add further arrows to the growing quiver of ammunition that the media landscape is continuing to sift beneath our feet.
For today, I want to highlight the data and analysis published last week by the media-centric private equity firm, Veronis, Suhlis & Stevenson (VSS) in its latest Communications Industry Forecast, covering through 2011. This has nuggets which, if accurate (this is a forecast) would bring to higher resolution the winners and losers in the media arena. For example, total spending on all communications grew substantially faster than GDP between 2001 and 2006. Furthermore, VSS predicts that communications industry spending will continue to grow faster than the overall economy through 2011, making it the third growing sector of the economy.
That’s some good news. On the other hand, the report finds that, for the first time since 1997, consumers spent less time with media in total last year than in the previous year. VSS believes this decrease, though small in percentage terms, is due to changing consumer behaviors and digital media efficiencies. “The drop in consumer media usage was driven by the continued migration of consumers to digital alternatives for news, information and entertainment, which require less time investment than their traditional media counterparts.” It continues: “Consumers typically watch broadcast or cable television at least 30 minutes per session while they spend as little as five to seven minutes viewing consumer-generated video clips online.”
VSS does not see this decrease as part of a long term trend, expecting consumer media usage to stabilize in 2007 and increase slightly through 2011. However, this would be driven by time spent with out-of-home media and videogames as the only major segments to achieve accelerating growth in this timeframe. Overall consumer time spent with media is forecast to increase at a compound rate of 0.5% from 2006 to 2011, down substantially to the 0.8% in the previous five-year period.
The real headline, however, is this prognostication: “In what would be a watershed moment in communications history, VSS predicts that Internet advertising – including pure-play websites and digital extensions of traditional media – will replace newspapers as the largest ad medium in 2011.”
I assume they mean that advertising in printed newspapers will be supplanted by advertising online—which includes the advertising that newspaper publishers generate from their online sites. Still it would be another stake in the heart of what once the biggest rooster in the barnyard.
But here’s another bombshell: “In addition to shifting their attention to alternative media, consumers are also migrating away from advertising-supported media, such as broadcast TV and newspapers, to consumer-supported platforms, such as cable TV and videogames.” Time spent with consumer-supported media grew at a compound rate of 19.8% from 2001 to 2006, while time spent with ad-supported media declined 6.3% in the period. This is not a measure of revenue but of consumer time spent. But with all the buzz about everyone moving to totally ad supported models (see Rebuilding Media’s latest foray into this space), this finding more than suggests that consumers are willing to part with their discretionary income for the right content or platform.
Another data point is found in a piece by Bobby White in The Wall Street Journal (sub. required). "Across the cable TV industry," writes White, "… independent channels are also turning away from TV to the Internet." Black Family History, The Lime Channel, The Employment and Career Channel, Horror Channel and HorseTV are among those that pulled the plug on their cable affiliation in favor a going Internet only.
“The shift illustrates how the Internet is offering a second chance to certain segments of old media. Web-based TV is now becoming a more viable business route, and Internet video is exploding. Running an online-only video channel, which doesn't require expensive cameras and broadcasting gear, is cheaper than operating a cable TV channel. While starting a new cable channel today takes an initial investment of $100 million to $200 million, a broadband channel needs just $5 million to $10 million to get going, says Boston-based research firm Broadband Directions.”
It’s a constant challenge when in the midst of change to separate trends from simple data points. One needs a series of data points over time that show direction. The Journal article may well be a data point that fits into the trends the VSS study provides. It seems though that enough data points are aggregating to confirm some direction with far reaching strategic implications for and broad array of players in the media industry.
Last week I participated with a small group for an informal half day mini-conference at MIT to revisit the arena of online micropayments. This was a very hot topic in both academia and among some newspaper people 10 years ago. As described by Bill Densmore, one of the pioneers of the movement, micropayments are
“…A system [for the Internet] for tracking, exchanging and settling value (including payments) for information commerce (text, music, game plays, entertainment, advertising views etc.).” Beyond that basic component, the premise of the conference organizers for such a system adds an ideological component: That the system “should be ubiquitous yet never be owned or controlled by either the government or a dominant private, for-profit entity. It needs to be massively distributed and - in some fashion - collaboratively owned.”
The backstory: Among the prognosticators at the start of the online age, the original business model for online information was that the user would pay for content. Why the need for a micropayments in the first place, when there are credit cards and the like? The assumption was that the transaction cost would be prohibitive for payments that might be five or ten cents to read an article. The earliest models, therefore, were monthly subscriptions, such as the first iterations of online versions of the Atlanta Journal & Constitution and the LA Times on the pioneering Prodigy service. Version 1 of USA Today on the Web was for a monthly subscription. Slate started free, then switched to mostly subscription, but went back to free when it became obvious that the revenue from subscribers in the thousands would be less than advertising revenue from readers in the hundreds of thousands or higher. But requiring subscriptions to anything could discourage spontaneous access to a stand alone article from nonaffiliated writers or minor publishers.
As we all know now, the mass audience never bought in to the option that it must pay for most of its news and general information. With a few readily identified exceptions (let’s think—oh, The Wall Street Journal Online comes to mind…), newspapers, magazines and everyone else soon discovered that they could make more money by offering free access and use the many additional eyeballs to sell advertising, initially in the format of banners and similar versions of “display” ads.
This model worked to a point. Still, it was particularly unsuited for the small players, who did not have the wherewithal to sell advertising and , in any event, with monthly hits in the hundred or thousands, could not get the interest of these advertisers.
But the marketplace works in neither strange nor mysterious ways. Aggregators such as Doubleclick soon arose to make it easier to include ads on a site. Later, the major breakthrough was the introduction of the AdSense program by Google. This created the column of text ads that are ubiquitous throughout the Web. The ads that are displayed are, more or less, related to the content of the Web site. AdSense has made it possible for small advertisers to get cost-effective targeted placement and has made it nearly effortless for even the most humble Web site to see some revenue.
This growth of Internet advertising was seen by some participants of the conference as having sidelined the development of any payment or user-identity systems. “Why did micropayments fail?” asked one of the conveners.
However micropayments have not failed-- they just did not evolve in the way that had been foreseen by the early developers. AdSense – and similar programs—have created a form of micropayments funded by a third party-- advertisers. Numerous Blogs and other information sources-- including some from mainstream media-- are earnings modest to substantial sums by way of aggregating many "clicks," frequently at five cents or 25 cents each. This is precisely the micropayments idea-- just from an unanticipated angle.
The objective of the mini-conference was to identify needs and requirements for an Internet information payments infrastructure and consider next steps on how to create the needed.
My own take on this—as I was asked-- was that if there is truly a need, then there are any number of smart entrepreneurs out in the universe who would grab the opportunity and an equally substantial group of venture capitalists looking for ways to invest in something that has not been done, is needed—and can be sold for a profit. This soluton, to be sure, runs into the ideological component among some in the community who hold that such a system cannot well serve content providers who may not be mainstream. I disagree. If the AdSense approach – i.e., free-- cannot generate enough income for this group of content providers, I have my doubts about how many takers they will have at ten cents a crack.
There is also growing evidence that strongly suggests that individuals and groups with something they want to say or show are not necessarily motivated by the money but rather by the opportunity of a forum. I call them missionaries, as opposed to "merchants" who are motivated by the profit motive more than the attraction of having a media platform. Hence the proliferation of Blogs, Podcasts and Web sites--many with sophisticated graphics and substantive content—yet without an obvious business model. This is the world of citizen media makers, about whom I will have more to say one of these days at my Who Owns the Media? Blog.
The Internet has provided a forum for a mind boggling cacophony of opinion, art, information and entertainment. The question for the next conference should be: Has the lack of a user-micropayment system held that back? How would the offerings via the Internet look differently if such a user-micropayment infrastructure was in place?
Vin Crosbie
Dorian Benkoil
Bob Cauthorn
Ben Compaine
The first question anyone following this thread would ask is why would any of these players consider opening up their tightly controlled phones? Right now, for example, Verizon customers who want GPS directions pay $10/month or $3.00 daily for data that cost Verizon almost nothing to provide. Other mobile phone data services bring in anywhere from $5 to $45 month. Why would Verizon agree to an open system that would blow open this cash cow?
